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In a period of heightened concern about fiscal consolidation in the Euro zone, a politically expedient way 
of dealing with the situation is to cut public investment. A critical question, however, is whether or not 
political  expediency  comes  at  a  cost,  in  terms  of  both  long-term  economic  performance  and  future 
budgetary  consolidation  efforts.  In  fact,  one  would  expect  any  type  of  investment,  including  public 
investment,  to  improve  the  long-term  economic  performance.  Moreover,  to  the  extent  that  public 
investment increases output in the long-term, it also expands the tax base and, therefore, tax revenues in 
the long term. It is conceivable that public investment has such strong effects on output, that over time it 
generates enough additional tax revenues to pay for itself. It is equally plausible that the effects on output 
although positive are not strong enough for the public investment to pay for itself. In the first case, cuts in 
public investment hurt long-term growth and make the future budgetary situation worse. In the second 
case,  cuts  in  public  investment  hurt  the  long-term  economic  performance  without  hurting  the  future 
budgetary situation. In this paper we investigate this question empirically in the context of a number of 
countries  in  the  Euro  zone  using  a  vector  auto-regressive/error  correction  mechanism  approach  to 
determine the effects of aggregated public investment on output, employment and private investment. Our 
ultimate objective is to determine in which regime do the different countries seem to fit and determine to 
what extent cuts in public investment may turn out to be counter-productive in the long-term from a 
budgetary perspective.  
 
JEL Classification: C32, E62, H54, O52 
Keywords: public-sector investment, economic growth, budgetary consolidation, European Union 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
In the seventies, the USA was affected by a decline in productivity. Several explanations were 
presented at the time, without referring, however, to the role of investment in infrastructures. In 1989 
Aschauer
1, when studying together, in econometric terms, the declines in investment and in productivity 
not only regarding USA but also a set of other developed countries, obtained results that conveyed a 
relationship between public investment and economic  growth. The obtained estimations in  this  work 
indicate that not only public capital proves to be productive, but also investment in public infrastructures 
makes private capital more profitable. That fact opened the political and economical debate that took 
place in the 90’s concerning public infrastructures and which was supported by the endogenous growth 
theory.      
                                                 
1 “Is Public Expenditure Productive?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 23,  pp. 177-200.   2 
The  empirical  works  accomplished  with  the  purpose  of  determining  the  impact  of  public 
investment upon growth have been following three distinct approaches. The very first one, adopted by 
Aschauer,  uses  one  sole  production  function  in  which  the  public  capital  stock  is  incorporated  as  an 
additional input, not paid in this case, together with labour and private capital. The second approach is 
named the behaviour one
2. The different authors make use of the dual theory in the estimation of a cost or 
profit functions in which the public infrastructure is incorporated as a fixed factor, with the purpose of 
determining the savings verified in costs
3. More recently and also with the purpose of appraising the 
relationships between public capital and economic growth, there has been a gradual use of the auto-
regressive/error correction mechanism approach vector (VAR/ECM). This model has the advantage of not 
imposing, in advance, any causality direction between the variables and of not requiring identification 
conditions derived from the economic theory. The VAR/ECM approach includes output, employment, 
private investment, and public investment and is designed to address the aforementioned econometric 
criticisms in a rigorous and comprehensive manner while highlighting the dynamic feedbacks among the 
different variables as well as the endogeneity of public investment decisions.  
In  this  paper  we  will  follow  the  VAR  approach,  adopting  the  methodology  suggested  by 
Pereira  (2000)  and  Pereira  and  Andraz  (2001).  We  will  try  to  attain  conclusions  concerning  public 
investment impact on the performance of other variables subject to analysis for eight countries of euro 
area: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal.  
However, in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact these countries have priorities in 
terms of growth, labour market flexibility and sustainable public finances. Since 2001 the fiscal position 
is deteriorated in the euro area where budget deficits were substantial, and in some cases above the 3 % of 
GDP excessive deficit ceiling. Faced with these budgetary pressures and political constraints, the margin 
of  manoeuvre  in  budgetary  matters  is  very  limited  and  cuts  in  public  investment  have  often  been 
regarded, at least implicitly, as the easy way out. Indeed, unlike the effects of reductions in other types of 
spending or of tax hikes, the effects of cuts in public investment take some time to reverberate throughout 
the economy. 
Nevertheless, a positive impact of public investment on output may represent also a positive 
impact on the tax Fiscal consolidation and so a critical question is whether or not political expediency 
comes at a cost, in terms of both long-term economic performance and future budgetary consolidation 
efforts. One would expect any type of investment, including public investment, to improve the long-term 
economic performance. Moreover, to the extent that public investment increases output in the long-term, 
it also expands the tax base and, therefore, tax revenues in the long term. It is conceivable that public 
investment has such strong effects on output, that over time it generates enough additional tax revenues to 
pay for itself. It is equally plausible that the effects on output although positive are not strong enough for 
the public investment to pay for itself. In the first case, cuts in public investment hurt long-term growth 
and make the future budgetary situation worse.  In the second case, cuts in public investment hurt the 
                                                 
2 It is designation given by Sturm (1998) in “Public Capital Expenditure in OCDE Countries”, U.K: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
3 The results of this saving only appear if the substitution effects of some private inputs come to exceed 
the complementary effects of other production factors.    3 
long-term  economic  performance  without  hurting  the  future  budgetary  situation.  To  identify  which 
scenario applies in these countries is fundamental to access the impact, and ultimately the wisdom, of any 
public investment cuts. And so, we study not only the long-term effects of public-sector investment on 
output but to determine to what extent cuts in this type of public investment may turn out to be counter-
productive in the long-term from a budgetary perspective.  
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the data, perform stationarity and 
co-integration tests, and proceed to determine the best VAR/ECM structures. In Section 3, we address the 
issue  of  the  identification  of  exogenous  innovations  to  public-sector  investment  as  well  as  the 
measurement of the effects of such innovations. In Section 4 we present the main results on the long-term 
effects of public-sector investment on output, employment and private investment as well as the potential 
budgetary implications of such results.  Finally in Section 5, we present some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Data and preliminary empirical results 
2.1  Data and some stylised facts 
The variables considered are GDP (Y), employment (L), private investment (Ip) and gross 
fixed capital formation of governments (Ig).   
We use annual data for the period 1980-2003 for all the countries. The data was obtained from 
the National Accounts as published in OECD (2005). All variables are measured in millions of constant 
2000 euros except for employment, which is measured in thousand of employees.  
Some of the basic information about public-sector investment is displayed in Figure 1.  Public-
sector  investment  as  a  percentage  of  the  GDP  decreased  for  all  the  period  in  Austria,  Belgium  and 
Germany. In the beginning of the period these countries presented high values, about 4%, and in the end 
almost that they were come close to 1%.  The remaining countries show a pattern more uniform with 
values always very next to 3%.  However, Portugal presented superior values slightly. 
 
2.2 Univariate and cointegration analysis 
We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) t-test to test the null hypothesis of a unit root and 
the Schwarz Criteria or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to determine the optimal the deterministic 
components.  
Test results are reported in Table 1.  For all of the variables in log-levels the t-statistics are 
greater than the critical values, either at 5% or at 1% significance levels, and that, therefore, we cannot 
reject for any of the variables the null hypothesis of a unit root. When applied to the first differences of 
the log-levels, i.e., to the growth rates of the original variables, however, the ADF tests allow us to reject 
the null hypothesis of the unit roots for all variables, since all the t-statistics are lower than the 5% critical 
values. Therefore, we can infer that all variables are stationary in first differences.  This is consistent with 
the macroeconomic literature and, in particular, with similar findings for the Portuguese case [see, for 
example, Pereira and Andraz, (2004a, 2004b)]. 
Having established that all variables are integrated of order one, we now test for cointegration 
among output, employment, private investment and public-sector investment. Due to our relatively small 
sample we use the Engle-Granger procedure, which is less vulnerable than the Johansen procedure to the   4 
small sample bias toward finding cointegration when it does not exist (Gonzalo and Lee, 1998; Gonzalo 
and Pitarakis, 1999). Following the standard Engle-Granger procedure, we perform four tests, each one 
with a different endogenous variable.  This is because it is possible that one of the variables enters the 
cointegrating relationship with a statistically insignificant coefficient.  In this case, a test that uses such 
variable as the endogenous  variable  would  not detect cointegration. We apply the  ADF t-test to the 
residuals of the different regressions. The optimal lag structure is chosen using the BIC and we consider 
alternative specifications for the deterministic components.  
 Cointegration test results are reported in Table 2.  We find that, in aggregate level and in the 
case of six countries, except France and Netherlands, the test statistics are higher that the 5% critical 
values, and therefore, in no case can we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals of the 
estimated equations. In the case of France and Netherlands one of the four tests suggests the possibility of 
cointegration.  The  results  are  similar  when  we  use  the  Johansen  test.  Accordingly,  we  do  not  find 
evidence  of  cointegration  among  the  variables  for  all  the  countries.  The  absence  of  cointegration  is 
consistent  with  other  results  in  the  literature  [see  again  Pereira  and  Andraz  (2004a,  2004b)  for  the 
Portuguese case].  Furthermore, the absence of cointegration is not problematic conceptually either.  This 
means that the data does  not show  evidence of convergence to the so-called  great ratios among the 
aggregate variables in the economy.  
 
2.3 VAR estimation 
We have determined that all of the variables in log-levels are stationary in first differences and 
that  they  are  not  cointegrated.    Accordingly,  we  follow  the  standard  procedure  in  the  literature  and 
determine the specifications of the VAR models using growth rates of the original variables. We estimate 
a VAR model, which include output, employment, and private investment.  For Germany we also use a 
dummy because the unification in 1991. 
The model specifications are determined using the BIC. The test results, which are reported in 
Table 3, suggest that the best specification, for France is a VAR model of first order with a constant term 
and trend, for Portugal and Italy is a VAR model of first order without a constant term and trend and for 
the remaining countries is a VAR model of first order with a constant term. 
Details of the VAR estimates are available upon request. The only point worth mentioning here 
is that the matrices of contemporaneous correlations among the estimated residuals show a block diagonal 
pattern, with innovations in public-sector investment showing a low contemporaneous correlation with 
the remaining  variables. The correlations between innovations in public-sector investment and in the 
other three variables are in absolute among 0.02 and 0.58. By contrast, contemporaneous correlations 
among the private-sector variables range from 0.18 and 0.87 in these different countries. 
 
3.   On the identification and Measurement of the Effects of Innovations  
3.1 Identifying Innovations in the public-sector investment variables 
In order to determine the effects of public investment we use the impulse-response functions 
associated  to  the  estimated  VAR  models.  In  determining  these  effects  it  is  important  to  consider 
innovations in public-sector investment that are not contemporaneously correlated to shocks in the other   5 
variables, thereby avoiding reverse causation problems. In dealing with this issue, we draw from the 
approach in the monetary policy literature [see, for example Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998), and Rudebush (1998)]. This approach was adapted in Pereira 
(2000, 2001) to the area of public investment in infrastructures in the United States and applied to the 
Portuguese case in Pereira and Andraz (2004a, 2004b). 
Ideally, the identification of exogenous shocks to public investment would result from knowing 
what fraction of the government appropriations is due to purely non-economic reasons. The econometric 
counterpart  to  this  idea  is  to  imagine  a  policy  function,  which  relates  the  rate  of  growth  of  public 
investment to the relevant information set.  In our case, the relevant information set could include the past 
and current observations of the growth rates of the private sector variables. The residuals from this policy 
function reflect the unexpected component to the evolution of public investment and are uncorrelated 
with other innovations. 
In the central case, we assume that the relevant information set for the public sector includes 
past  but  not  current  values  of  the  other  variables.  This  is  equivalent  in  the  context  of  the  standard 
Choleski decomposition to assuming that innovations in public-sector investment lead innovations in the 
other variables. This means that we allow innovations in public-sector investment to affect the other 
variables contemporaneously, but not the reverse.  We have two reasons for making this our central case.  
First, it is reasonable to assume that the private sector reacts within a year to innovations in public-sector 
investment decisions. Second, it also seems reasonable to assume that the public sector is unable to adjust 
public investment decisions to innovations in the private-sector variables within a year. This is due to the 
time lags involved in information gathering and decision-making. Despite the imminent plausibility of 
this central case scenario, when reporting the effects of public-sector investment we consider all twenty-
four possible orderings of the variables within the context of the Choleski decomposition and present the 
corresponding range of results.  
The policy functions are reported in Table 4. Our result suggest that changes in public-sector 
investment are positively correlated to the lagged changes in private investment for France and Italy, 
negatively correlated to lagged changes in output for France, positively correlated to the lagged changes 
in output for Netherlands and positively correlated to the lagged changes in labour for Finland. This 
means that public-sector investment is not an exogenous variable but rather follows a well-defined policy 
rule. Indeed, growing output means also a growing tax base and the potential for greater public-sector 
investment  while  growing  private  investment  tends  to  encourage  public  investment  in  that  both  are 
complementary. In France, the negative evolution of the product originates positive alterations of public 
investment, leading to an acceleration of this, perhaps it acts as a counter-cyclical tool. In Finland the 
results suggest that a positive growth of labour needs a human capital formation.  
 For Austria, Belgium, Germany and Portugal the result suggest that changes in public-sector 
investment  are  uncorrelated  to  lagged  changes  in  private  sector  variables  and  so  we  can  say  it  is 
exogenous. It maybe interesting to note the findings in Pereira and Andraz (2004a, 2004b) for public 
investment in transportation infrastructures in Portugal suggest that the changes in public investment are 
uncorrelated with changes in the private sector variables and therefore public investment in transportation   6 
infrastructures is an exogenous variable. This is due to the fact that investment in public infrastructure in 
the last couple of decades, however, has been mostly linked to the EU Structural Transfer Programs. 
 
3.2 Measuring the effects of innovations in the public-sector investment variables 
We consider the effects of one-time one-percentage point innovations in the rates of growth of 
public-sector investment. We expect these innovations to have at least temporary effects on the growth 
rates of the other variables.  However, by definition, even temporary effects on the growth rates of the 
private sector variables will translate into permanent effects on the levels of these variables.  
The long-term elasticities of the different variables with respect to public-sector investment as 
well as the corresponding ranges of variation are reported in Table 5. Long-term is defined as the time 
horizon over which the growth effects of innovations disappear, i.e., the accumulated impulse-response 
functions converge. These elasticities represent long-term accumulated percentage point changes per one 
percentage point in long-term accumulated change in public investment. A cursory look at the results 
suggests that the ranges of variation for the elasticity figures are always relatively small. This means that 
our central assumptions are not only the most plausible but are also robust. This fact offers no surprise, 
since as pointed out, the matrices of contemporaneous correlations among the estimated residuals display 
low correlations between innovations in public-sector investment and in private-sector variables.   
In Tables 6 and 7 we report marginal product figures.  These figures measure the change in 
million euros in output and private investment and the number of jobs created for one million euros in 
accumulated change in public-sector investment. We obtain the marginal products by multiplying the 
average ratio of the private  sector variable to public-sector investment  for the last ten  years, by the 
corresponding elasticity. The choice of average ratio  for the last ten  years is designed to reflect the 
relative scarcity of public-sector investment without letting these ratios be overly affected by business 
cycle factors. In turn, rates of return are calculated from the marginal product figures by assuming a life 
horizon of twenty years for all types of public capital assets.  These are the rates which, if applied to one 
euro  over  a  twenty-year  period,  yield  the  value  of  the  marginal  products.  They  are  adjusted  to 
accommodate a linear depreciation rate of 5%, which is implicit in the life horizon of twenty years.  
 
4.   Public-sector investment and economic performance 
4.1 On the effects of public-sector investment on employment and private investment 
Estimation results reported in Table 6 suggest that public-sector investment has a positive effect 
on  both  employment  and  private  investment  to  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy  and  Portugal  and  a 
negative one to Austria, Belgium and Netherlands. These figures imply that, to the former, public-sector 
spending lead to the creation in the long-term, respectively, of 30, 32, 371, 129 and 68 for each million of 
euros in public-sector investment and that private investment increases in the long-term by 1.5, 1.4, 2.5, 
0.7 and 4.4 million euros for each million of euros in public-sector investment. 
By  contrast,  we  find  that  public-sector  investment  to  Austria,  Belgium  and  Netherlands 
decreases the number of jobs, in the long term, respectively, in 21, 3 and 219, for each million of euros 
and that private investment decreases in the long-term by 0.09, 2.7 and 4.6 million euros for each million 
of euros in public-sector investment.   7 
4.2 On the effects of public-sector investment on output 
Estimation results reported in Table 7 suggest that public-sector investment has a positive effect 
on output for all the countries, except for Netherlands, which corresponds to a marginal product of 0.3, 
0.2, 1.7, 3.6, 7.0, 8.6 and 3.2 respectively to Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and 
Portugal. This means that the increase of one million euros in public investment induces a long-term 
increase of 0.3, 0.2, 1.7, 3.6, 7.0, 8.6 and 3.2 million euros in output respectively.  
Although these positive values the corresponding annual rate of return to Austria and Belgium 
are highly negative.  Finland has a rate below what one would expect from private sector investments. On 
the other hand the results for Germany and Italy are greatly above.  
 
4.3 On the budgetary impact of public-sector investment 
Having established that public-sector investment affects output positively in the long-term, we 
now turn to its potential long-term budgetary impact. To understand the issue we need to recognise that a 
positive effect of public-sector investment on output also means an increased tax base and, therefore, 
translates into increased tax revenues. It is, therefore, conceivable that over time public-sector investment 
has such strong effects on output that it generates enough additional tax revenues to pay for itself. It is 
equally plausible that the effects on output although positive are not strong enough for public-sector 
investment to pay for itself.  In the first case, cuts in current public-sector investment not only hurt long-
term growth but also make the future budgetary situation worse.  In the second case, such cuts hurt the 
long-term output prospects but help budgetary situation in the long-term. 
The effective tax rate
4 for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal were 
34.4%, 20.4%, 31.2%, 39.1%, 27.8%, 23.8% and 31.6%, in that order. Given that one million euros in 
public sector-investment lead to an accumulated increase in output of 0.28, 0.19, 1.70, 3.63, 7.01, 8.63 
and 3.23 million euros, this means that tax revenues increase in the long term by 0.10, 0.04, 0.53, 1.42, 
1.95, 2.05 and 1.02 million euros, respectively. Accordingly, public-sector investment does not pay for 
itself over time in the form of future tax revenues in Austria, Belgium and Finland. Therefore, cuts in 
public-sector investment although undesirable from the standpoint of long-term output performance do 
not have an adverse effect in the long-term budgetary position of the public sector.    
The  analysis  to  the  others  countries  provides  a  richer  picture.  The  public-sector  investment 
spending in one million euros increases tax revenues over time by 1.42, 1.95, 2.05 and 1.02 million euros, 
to France, Germany, Italy and Portugal. This means that cuts in public-sector investment have adverse 
long-term effects on both GDP and the budgetary situation to these four countries.   
It is, in this context, relevant to compare these results with the results obtained in Pereira and 
Andraz (2004a, 2004b) for public investment in transportation infrastructures, including national roads, 
municipal roads, highways, ports, airports and railroads. The estimated marginal product for these types 
of public investments is 9.5 million euros. This implies that in the long-term the public sector would 
collect  3.33  million  euros  in  tax  revenues  for  each  million  euros  in  public  infrastructure  spending. 
Accordingly, public investment in transportation infrastructures more than pays for itself and is a good 
                                                 
4 This is the average overall (corporate plus personal) tax rate for the years since 2000 to 2005, according 
to OECD tax database (for Finland we considered only 2005, because the data are not available).    8 
strategy from a long-term public budgetary perspective. Clearly, despite all semantic similarities, not all 
public investments are created equal.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we address a question of the utmost importance in the context of budgetary policy 
in eight Euro area countries, namely, the long-term economic and budgetary effects  of public-sector 
investment.  The impact of public-sector investment on output is important in itself from a long-term 
growth perspective. It is also important from a long-term budgetary perspective. This is because a positive 
impact on output also represents a positive impact on the tax base and therefore, leads to the critical 
empirical question of whether or not public-sector investment pays for itself in the form of future tax 
revenues.  If it does, then current cuts in public investment spending not only jeopardise long-term growth 
but also make the long-term budgetary situation more difficult. If not then only the negative long-term 
growth effects remain but public investment cuts do help the budgetary situation in the long-term. 
  In this paper we find that public-sector investment has a positive effect on long-term 
economic  performance  for  seven  countries,  except  for  Netherlands.  Therefore,  public-investment 
spending cuts to help current budgetary consolidation efforts come with a price in terms of long-term 
economic performance.  We find, however, the positive effects are not strong enough for public-sector 
investment spending to pay for itself in the form of future tax revenues in Austria, Belgium and Finland. 
Therefore, cuts in public-sector investment spending seem to be an effective way to deal with the public 
budgetary  situation  in  the  short  term  without  jeopardising  the  long-term  budgetary  situation.    It  is 
important to note, however, that the results in France, Germany, Italy and Portugal suggest that cuts in 
public investment would affect output so strongly that would also have negative long-term effects on the 
effort toward fiscal consolidation. This is consistent with recent evidence in Pereira and Andraz (2004a, 
2004b) in transportation infrastructures to Portugal. Clearly not all types of public-sector investment are 
the same.   9 
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Table 1: Unit roots tests 
 
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller       Augmented Dickey-Fuller  
country  series  lags  τ     country  series  lags  τ    
y  1  -2.1640  constant and trend  y  0  -3.0196  constant and trend 
l  2  -2.9236  constant and trend  l  1  -2.6827  constant and trend 
ip  0  -2.7722  constant and trend  ip  1  -2.2208  constant  
ig  0  -1.6057  none  ig  0  -2.3161  constant  
 y  0  -4.0050**  constant   y  0  -3.7955**  constant 
 l  1  -3.4440*  constant   l  0  -3.6261*  constant  


















 ig  0  -3.6173**  none 
y  1  -3.1520  constant and trend  y  1  -2.7460  constant and trend 
l  1  -3.5287  constant and trend  l  1  -2.9794  constant and trend 
ip  0  -1.3986  constant   ip  1  -3.4760  constant and trend 
ig  0  -1.8838  constant   ig  0  1.8996  none 
 y  1  -2.0019*  none   y  0  -3.1012*  constant 
 l  1  -2.8719**  none   l  1  -2.1511*  none 

















 ig  0  -3.4784**  none 
y  1  -1.6900  constant and trend  y  1  -1.9987  constant and trend 
l  0  -1.7196  constant and trend  l  1  -2.9500  constant and trend 
ip  1  -1.7890  constant and trend  ip  1  -3.1228  constant and trend 
ig  1  -1.8585  constant and trend  ig  0  -2.5319  constant  
 y  1  -2.9779*  constant   y  0  -3.5779*  constant 
 l  0  -3.9041**  none   l  0  -2.6160*  none 
















 ig  0  -5.5951**  none 
y  1  -3.0786  constant and trend  y  1  -3.5977  constant and trend 
l  1  -1.8407  constant   l  0  -2.5622  constant and trend 
ip  1  -2.5549  constant and trend  ip  1  -3.5328  constant and trend 
ig  0  -2.3836  constant and trend  ig  0  -1.8767  constant and trend 
 y  1  -3.9142**  constant   y  1  -1.9839*  none 
 l  1  -6.3969**  constant    l  0  -3.6933**  none 























 ig  0  -2.6694**  none 
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Table 2: Co-integration tests 
    Augmented Dickey-Fuller       Augmented Dickey-Fuller  
country  series  lags  τ     country  series  lags  τ    
y  0  -3.1474  none  y  0  -3.0327  none 
l  0  -2.2430  none  l  0  -1.9202  none 
ip  0  -2.8273  none  ip  0  -3.0722  none 
Austria 
ig  0  -2.0465  none 
Belgium 
ig  0  -3.1648  none 
y  0  -0.7563  none  y  1  -4.1652*  none 
l  1  -1.8242  none  l  1  -2.1216  none 
ip  0  -2.2176  none  ip  1  -3.1986  none  Finland 
ig  0  -3.4607  none 
France 
ig  0  -2.3779  none 
y  1  -2.4355  none  y  0  -3.3365  none 
l  0  -2.9568  none  l  1  -2.8431  none 
ip  1  -3.0341  none  ip  1  -3.3414  none  Germany 
ig  0  -1.9750  none 
Italy 
ig  0  -2.2166  none 
y  1  -3.2165  none  y  0  -2.0414  none 
l  1  -4.4229**  none  l  0  -2.2888  none 
ip  1  -2.7810  none  ip  1  -3.6052  none  Netherlands 
ig  0  -2.3750  none 
Portugal 
ig  0  -2.6988  none 
*significant at 5% level;** significant at 1% level           
τ
 :
 critical values –3.74 and -4.30 respectively 5% and 1%           
 
 
Table 3: BIC tests for VAR specification 
country  tests  none  constant  const and trend 
Austria  VAR(1)  -28.9738  -29.4947  -29.3539 
Belgium  VAR(1)  -28.0111  -28.3200  -28.0939 
Finland  VAR(1)  -26.2306  -27.1945  -26.8386 
France  VAR(1)  -31.8392  -31.9318  -32.4584 
Germany  VAR(1)  -26.2893  -26.7745  -26.7496 
Italy  VAR(1)  -29.6693  -29.4912  -29.5403 
Netherlands  VAR(1)  -30.3700  -30.3921  -30.1413 




Table 4: Policy Functions 
country 
  
dummy  constant  trend   ig(-1)   ip(-1)   l(-1)   y(-1) 
----  -0.0066  ----  0.0121  -0.2442  2.0533  -1.2599  Austria   ig 
   (-0.1108)     (0.0478)  (-0.3215)  (0.4274)  (-0.4472) 
----  0.0209  ----  0.2377  0.2635  0.1162  -2.5449  Belgium   ig 
   (0.3782)     (0.9014)  (0.4682)  (0.0379)  (-0.8859) 
----  0.0154  ----  -0.5156  -0.2485  2.7997  0.3343  Finland   ig 
   (0.4468)     (-2.0519)  (-0.5312)  (1.6790)  (0.2459) 
----  0.1192  -0.0037  0.0817  0.9188  3.3286  -4.2032  France   ig 
   (2.2166)  (-1.4086)  (0.3155)  (1.9840)  (1.2238)  (-2.1101) 
-0.0229  -0.0508  ----  0.1199  -0.0963  0.1654  2.3858  Germany   ig 
(-0.9975)  (-1.5900)     (0.5169)  (-0.1764)  (0.6423)  (1.4902) 
----  ----  ----  -0.3881  1.3534  0.1764  -1.4590  Italy   ig 
         (-1.5572)  (1.8295)  (0.0778)  (-1.0625) 
----  -0.0313  ----  -0.0433  -0.1636  -0.2023  2.5350  Netherlands   ig 
   (-1.1855)     (-0.1684)  (-0.3923)  (-0.3077)  (1.7347) 
----  ----  ----  0.0070  0.4614  2.1096  -0.6718  Portugal   ig 
         (0.0327)  (1.3500)  (1.3569)  (-0.6128) 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
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Table 5: Long-term accumulated elasticities with respect to public-sector investment 
country  variable  output  employment  private 
investment 
 public investment          
central case  0.0048  -0.0176  -0.0079  Austria 
range of variation  [-0.0238;0.0305]  [-0.0395;0.0091]  [-0.0849;0.1173] 
 public investment          
central case  0.0033  -0.0035  -0.2536  Belgium 
range of variation  [-0.0035;0.0443]  [-0.0073;0.0216]  [-0.2805;-0.0033] 
 public investment          
central case  0.0486  0.0474  0.2635  Finland 
range of variation  [-0.1936;0.0564]  [-0.2512;0.0558]  [-0.5342;0.2930] 
 public investment          
central case  0.1106  0.0567  0.2711  France 
range of variation  [-0.0008;0.1106]  [-0.0193;0.0567]  [-0.1272;0.2711] 
 public investment          
central case  0.1307  0.3594  0.2528  Germany 
range of variation  [-0.0662;0.1307]  [-0.1839;0.3594]  [-0.1759;0.2528] 
 public investment          
central case  0.1970  0.1483  0.0955  Italy 
range of variation  [-0.4734;0.3391]  [-0.0758;0.1593]  [-0.5511;0.3536] 
 public investment          
central case  -0.1968  -0.3311  -0.7733  Netherlands 
range of variation  [-0.1968;0.0090]  [-0.3311;0.0381]  [-0.7733;-0.1361] 
 public investment          
central case  0.1247  0.0595  0.7760  Portugal 
range of variation  [-0.4788;0.1247]  [-0.1743;0.0595]  [-0.1551;0.7760] 
 
 
Table 6: Long-term effects of public-sector investment on employment and private investment 
employment  private investment 
country 
elasticity  number of jobs  elasticity  marginal productivity 
Austria  -0.0176  -21  -0.0079  -0.0935 
Belgium  -0.0035  -3  -0.2536  -2.7234 
Finland  0.0474  30  0.2635  1.4800 
France  0.0567  32  0.2711  1.3775 
Germany  0.3594  371  0.2528  2.5341 
Italy  0.1483  129  0.0955  0.6886 
Netherlands  -0.3311  -219  -0.7733  -4.5945 
Portugal  0.0595  68  0.7760  4.3540 
 
 
Table 7: Long-term effects of public-sector investment on output 
country  elasticity  marginal 
productivity  rate of return 
Austria  0.0048  0.2775  -6.2 
Belgium  0.0033  0.1925  -7.9 
Finland  0.0486  1.6999  2.7 
France  0.1106  3.6271  6.7 
Germany  0.1307  7.0132  10.2 
Italy  0.1970  8.6314  11.4 
Netherlands  -0.1968  -6.5486  --- 
Portugal  0.1247  3.2349  6.0 
   13


















Germany Austria Belgium Finland
France Italy Netherlands Portugal
 